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little doubt that a multilateral GI register would ulti-
mately comprise all goods, not iust wine. Expansion is
already a WTO agenda item,4 and there is little inherent
logic in maintaining distinct rules for wines and spirits.
The EU TRIPs proposal calls for inclusion on the mul-
tilateral register of terms already found on national or
regional registers without further substantive examina-
tion, but subiect to a member country’s right to chal-
lenge a term it considers ineligible for protection in its
territory, on prescribed grounds.5 Under present pro-
posals, inclusion of a GI on the multilateral register
would have the direct legal effect of affording it TRIPs
protection (Art.23) in any Member State that has not
challenged it.
Many member countries outside Europe have either
no GI registration or only low-level systems of registra-
tion,6 some requiring certification of geographical ori-
Controversy surrounds current proposals to increase
global protection for registered GIs by way of muhi-
lateral negotiations under TRIPs. 1 Mooted expansion is
twofold: by establishing a multilateral register of GIs for
wines and spirits, with resulting protection in Member
States; and by extending the higher level of TRIPs pro-
tection now enjoyed by wine GIs to other goods.2
Negotiations relating to registered GIs do not benefit
from broad harmony about the universal need for, or
the basic principles of legal protection. The European
Union and some of its member countries have well-
established high-level protection for geographical indi-
cations for food by way of registration. These systems
impose strict norms, determined and enforced by statu-
tory bodies, concerning both geographical origin and
product standards (mandatory production methods).
The European Union favours what amounts to par-
tial elevation of the EU regional GI framework to a
global level.3 Whereas the present proposals for a multi-
lateral register only extend to wine GIs, there can be
1 As of February 5, 2003 the WTO had 145 Member States.
As of the same date the United Nations had 191 Member States.
For a useful account of some of the WTO negotiations and
proposals, and analysis of developing country interests, see D.
Vivas-Eugui, "Negotiations on Geographical Indications in the
TRIPS Council and their effect on the WTO Agricultural Nego-
tiations, Implications for developing countries and the case of
Venezuela" (2001) 4/5 Journal of World Intellectual Property
703-729. For an account of the negotiation process resulting in
TRIPs, see D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting history
and analysis (2nd ed., 2003).
2 Protection does not have to be limited to foodstuffs, but this
article limits consideration to food. If not limited to foodstuffs,
then protected products could include carpets, cigars, rice, cof-
fee, fish, tea, porcelain (e.g. Limoges is a protected GI in
France). If not to all products, the extension could be limited to
handicrafts and artisanal items. See the EU proposal presented
to the TRIPs Council: documents IP/C/W/107 and IP/C/
W/107/Rev. 1. In any case food forms the focal point of GI pro-
tection, industrial products only relatively rarely being registered
as GIs. The EU system established under Regulation 2081/92
only covers food. For background on existing national systems,
etc., see Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, indus-
trial designs and geographical indications, Eighth Session (SCT
8/4), Document SCT/6/3 Rev. on "Geographical Indications:
Historical Background, Nature of Rights, Existing Systems for
Protection and Obtaining Protection in other Countries" (Pre-
pared by the Secretariat).
3 EU-wide registration in relation to foodstuffs other than wine
was established by Council Regulation 2081/92 of July 14, 1992
on the protection of geographical indications and designations of
origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs ([1992] O.J.
L208; below: "Regulation 2081/92"). More precisely, what is
proposed by the European Union amounts to a system incorpo-
rating both Regulation 2081/92 elements and Lisbon elements
into the WTO mechanisms (Lisbon Agreement for the Protec-
tion of Appellations of Origin and their International Registra-
tion).
4 Although contentious: there was considerable disagreement
as to whether the Fourth WTO Ministerial Meeting in Doha
mandated negotiations for the extension of protection for GIs for
products other than wine and spirits; see para.12 of the Doha
Declaration.
5 See the revised EU proposal for the multilateral register,
IP/C/W/107/Rev. 1, June 22, 2000: "Implementation of Article
23.4 of the TRIPS agreement relating to the establishment of a
multilateral system of notification and registration of geograph-
ical indications" (Communication from the European Commu-
nities and their Member States). The grounds/of opposition
proposed are that the term does not conform to the TRIPs
definition of a GI (see Art.22.1 of TRIPs); that the GI contains
a false indication as to origin; that the GI is generic; and the
absence of national protection. Controversially the EU proposal
does not provide for opposition on the basis of a pre-existing
registered trade mark incorporating a GI. By contrast, the Hun-
garian proposal provides for opposition on the basis of prior
trade mark registrations also (see WIPO IP/C/W/255, May 3,
2001). See also Council of TRIPs, JOB (03)/75, "Draft text of
Multilateral system of notification and registration of GI’s for
wines and spirits", April 16, 2003. Note that oppositions can
only be lodged by states and not in any circumstance by owners
of prior trade marks directly. However, under the Hong Kong
proposal (see WTO TN/IP/W/8, April 23, 2003) the domestic
courts would decide about the applicability of genericness or
prior trade mark exceptions, rather than these issues being incor-
porated into the multilateral registration process itself.
6 See for instance for Malaysia: Geographical Indications Act
2000, Geographical Indications Regulations 2001, and Geo-
graphical Indications (Amendment) Act 2002; New Zealand
also has GI registration legislation but it has not yet entered into
force; for Australia see the Australian Wine and Brandy Cor-
poration Act 1980 (Cth). In Turkey, see Decree Law No: 555
Pertaining to the Protection of Geographical Signs, which
entered into force on June 27, 1995; in India see the Geo-
graphical Indication of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act
1999 (as analysed in Managing Intellectual Property, Special Sup-
plement to April 2003 issue, The India IP Focus: "GI’s labour
under unequal terms", pp.95 et seq.); see also S. Chaturvedi,
"India, the EU and GI’s: Convergence of interests and chal-
lenges ahead", Research and Information Systems for the Non-
aligned and Other Developing Countries (RIS) (2002). The
TRIPs definition of a geographical indication does not require
that product standards apply, but only that characteristics or
reputation are essentially attributable to geographical origin. If
only reputation is derived from geographical origin, then obser-
vance of consistent product standards is arguably not essential.
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gin but not observance of separate product standards.7
Some of these countries do not favour global expansion
of the EU regional registration model, and question the
universal applicability of the policy basis for the intro-
duction of registered OI systems.8 In terms of safe-
guarding reputation and preventing consumer
deception, existing laws are seen as sufficient, and as a
consequence, a multilateral register with direct legal
effect is seen as unnecessary.
The absence of the broad-based consensus that
underpins other areas of IP law results from the mixed
status of GI.. registration: it is both an instrument of
agricultural policy, and a form of intellectual property.
Whereas the economic and policy basis for legal protec-
tion for reputation is widely accepted, the agricultural
policy impact of various GI registration systems is the
root cause of much of the current disagreement. Dispa-
rate national agricultural policy perspectives arguably
cause more controversy within WTO than any other
subject-matter. The difficult negotiations surrounding
registered GIs reflect this once again, as does the lack of
consensus concerning priority between trade mark
rights and registered GIs.
Against this background, undecided WTO member
countries find themselves compelled to assess their
national interest and take a considered position in rela-
tion to registered GIs. If they are to benefit from the
multilateral register, they must address three significant
questions:
(1) Will the domestic economy benefit from the
introduction of a registration system for GIs which
is compliant with TRIPS?
(2) Will export trade performance be enhanced by
the introduction of a registration system for GIs,
given the TRIPs provisions relating to GIs?
(3) What trade-offs can be obtained in the context
of trade negotiations, in return for support for
global expansion of GI protection?
This article will contend that a member country must
primarily decide whether its domestic economy will ulti-
mately benefit from the protection by registration of its
own geographical terms, and the accompanying reg-
ulatory:structures. The other questions, relating to the
potential "recovery" of reputed geographical terms in
export markets, or to concessions that might be gained
in other areas of trade negotiation, are subordinate: The
main question is whether GI registration is a beneficial
7 e.g. in Australia the Australian Wine and Brandy Corpora-
tion Act 1980 (Cth) provides for wine GI registrations but only
requires proof of origin, not observance of product standards.
8 A lack of enthusiasm is perhaps also demonstrated by the low
level of adoption of international treaties relating to GI registra-
tion, principally the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of
Appellations of Origin and their International Registration. As to
proposals that tend to counter the EU position, see e.g. IP/C/
W/133/Rev. 1 "Proposal for a multilateral system for notification
and registration of geographical indications based on article 23.4
of the TRIPS agreement", Revision (Communication from Can-
ada, Chile, Japan and the United States), July 26, 1999; IP/C/
W/289, June 29, 2001, (Communication from Argentina,
Australia, Canada, Chile, Guatemala, New Zealand, Paraguay
and the United States): "Extension of the protection of geo-
graphical indications for wines and spirits to geographical indi-
cations for all products: potential costs and implications".
addition to a current domestic policy matrix, including
both IP and agricultural policy.
But would adoption of current EU proposals actually
compel Member States to introduce a registration sys-
tem for domestic Gls? The proposals would allow mem-
ber countries considerable latitude in determining how
extensive a domestic regulatory framework for GIs
should be. Countries without a registered GI tradition
could theoretically comply by adopting rules geared
solely to the protection of foreign terms, as is also an
option for wines under the current TRIPs provisions, or
amending existing rules to the same effect. This would
obviate the need to set up the elaborate system required
to register, control and enforce local GIs.
However, the proposed multilateral register differs
considerably from the current structure in relation to
wine GIs.9 Presently a member country is TRIPs-com-
pliant if it affords individual applicants, foreign or local,
protection against misappropriation of a wine GI with-
out the need to prove consumer deception.1° This
requires some form of a priori identification of the pro-
tected wine GIs, as the TRIPs protection goes beyond
that normally afforded by general rules against unfair
competition, or the action against passing off.1~ This
can be achieved by malting available to individual appli-
cants the right to apply for inclusion of a term on a
domestic GI register, or as a certification or collective
mark,12 or on some other sui generis register established
specifically to receive individual applications for protec-
tion of foreign wine GIs.13
By contrast, under the EU multilateral register pro-
posal a country would have to afford all names on the
multilateral register some form of automatic domestic
registration, which enabled the owner to claim tge legal
protection afforded under TRIPs. 14 Terms on the multi-
lateral register would also--and very controversially--
achieve precedence even over existing registered trade
marks in Member States. For individual owners of reg-
istered GIs this has the clear intended advantage of
9 The current provisions in fact cover both wines and spirits.
10 This only applies to terms that comply with the TRIPs
definition of GI, which requires proof of connection between
region of origin and qualities or reputation of the product: see
Art.22.1 TRIPs; see also Art.24.9 TRIPs.
11 More precisely, in terms of Art.23.1 TRIPs: "Each Member
shall provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent use
of a geographical indication identifying wines for wines not origi-
nating in the place indicated by the geographical indication in
question or identifying spirits for spirits not originating in the
place indicated by the geographical indication in question, even
where the true origin of the goods is indicated or the geograph-
ical indication is used in translation or accompanied by expres-
sions such as ’kind’, ’type’, ~style’, ’imitation’ or the like".
12 Arguably such marks would achieve the effect that Art.23
(see n. 11 above) requires, i.e. a remedy without proof of con-
sumer deception where the mark is used on similar goods.
13 Alternatively a state can go beyond affording individuals a
right of application and enter into a bilateral agreement with
another member for the mutual recognition and registration of
registered GIs.
14 Unless a challenge has been lodged by a member country.
The EU proposal provides: "Participating Members shall facili-
tate the protection of an individual registered geographical indi-
cation by providing the legal means for interested parties to use
the registration as a presumption of the eligibility for the protec-
tion of the geographical indication": see IP/C/W/107/Rev. 1, June
22, 2000. The protection concerned is the protection afforded
by TRIPs Art.23(1).
[2004] E.I.P.R. ISSUE 4 © SWEET & MAXWELL LIMITED [AND CONTRIBUTORS]
172 VAN CAENEGEM: REGISTERED GIs: [2004] E.I.P.R.
obviating the need to lodge individual applications in
foreign jurisdictions. But for member countries without
established registered GI systems, it would impose far
greater regulatory costs than the present wine GI obli-
gations do. Even a minimal system directed solely at the
protection of foreign GIs for wine would necessitate the
establishment of public law mechanisms, inter alia to
examine and reconcile inconsistencies with domestic
trade marks--unless the EU proposal is adopted, not
permitting opposition to prior trade mark grounds
--and homonymous place names, and to determine
whether to challenge the eligibility for protection within
the territory on a prescribed basis such as genericness or
inconsistency with the TRIPs definition. 15
Furthermore, a minimal system with no or insignif-
icant domestic registration would also prevent a mem-
ber country from ever deriving the advantage of
international protection from the proposed register,
since inclusion of GIs on the multilateral register can
only derive from prior domestic registration.1~ If the
multilateral register applies to wine only, this may not
be a major concern. But there is no reason in logic to
maintain such distinct treatment, and one can only pre-
sume that the multilateral register will eventually come
to cover all goods, or at least all foodstuffs. The result
would be a skewed system, where only countries with
already well-established GI registration systems would
derive much benefit from the global protection resulting
from the multilateral register. Other countries would
suffer the regulatory costs of protecting foreign GIs,
with no prospect of any great domestic or export bene-
fit, in either the short or the long term. Only if they have
their own national register from which terms can be
uploaded to the multilateral register to achieve a level of
global protection can they possibly derive some future
benefit. But is it worth having a domestic registration
system for GIs in the first place?
In other words, will GI registration benefit the
domestic economy, in particular agricultural and rural
incomes and production?17 Answering this requires
prior analysis of the merits and demerits of such sys-
tems, and also consideration of the broader policy set-
tings of national agricultural and rural sectors. If the
15 The EU proposal (see nn.5 and 14 above) requires that a
Member State challenges "in a duly justified manner". The
Chairman’s Note of April 16, 2003 (JOB(03)/75: "Draft of multi-
lateral system of notification and registration of geographical
indications for wines and spirits"), which contains various possi-
ble versions of a legal instrument establishing the Register, pro-
vides as one option that the grounds for a challenge would be
specified, and would be: non-conformity with the TRIPs defini-
tion of Art.22(1); inherent falsity; genericness; and exceptions
under Art.4(4) and (5) of TRIPs. As to the relationship between
registered trade marks and geographical indications on the mul-
tilateral register, and the application of Art.2.3 concerning inval-
idation of trade marks containing a misleading geographical
indication, the Chairman’s note is silent. About the relationship
between trade marks and geographical indications in general, see
WIPO SCT/5/3, "Possible solutions for conflicts between trade-
marks and geographical indication and for conflicts between
homonymous geographical indications" (International Bureau,
June 8, 2000).
16 Moreover, such domestic registrations would have to con-
form to the requirements of TRIPs if the registered terms are to
be entered on to the multilateral register.
17 Again, as pointed out above, although GI registration can
extend to all goods, foodstuffs, and not industrial goods, are the
key to this debate; see n.2 above.
conclusion is that it makes sense to have a domestic
system of protection for registered GIs, then the further
question is what form it should take.
It is contended below that a high-level system, i.e. one
which combines proof of geographical origin and adher-
ence to product standards, has the greatest theoretical
merit. However, such a system amounts to a pervasive
intervention in patterns of agricultural production, with
some detrimental economic impacts. It may thus hold
few attractions to countries with incompatible agricul-
tural industry structure and policies.
After an overview of current standpoints, the theoret-
ical arguments relating to registered GI systems are
considered below. Then some benefits that countries
without a GI tradition might derive, in terms of inter-
national negotiations and trade, from support for cur-
rent EU proposals, are considered.
Europe and the New World: Division among
Member States
The European Union and other Member States
The European Union is the principal advocate of
greater protection for GIs around the world, by way of
bilateral negotiations, in the context of WTO/TRIPs or
in the context of the WTO Agriculture Agreement
negotiations.18 The main thrust of the Union’s ambi-
tions with regard to GIs is apparently threefold: first, to
recoup as many "lost" GIs as possible, whether through
multilateral or bilateral arrangements; secondly, to
ensure that all registered European GIs automatically
enjoy increased protection around the world; and
thirdly, to achieve a uniform high level of protection for
all GIs globally, whether for wine or all’: agricultural
foodstuffs for human consumption. The "recoupment"
of lost GIs has two elements: the phasing out of generic
use and establishing the pre-eminence of GI registration
over trade mark rights, even if prior registered. If all this
comes to pass, the historical trend which saw the adop-
tion in 1992 of regional EU GI registration, partly mod-
elled on national laws, would be further extended to the
global level.
The principal momentum behind the European
Union’s appeals for greater GI protection comes from
Mediterranean EU states, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and
above all France, where traditional, specialised, small
scale, non-commoditised agricultural practices remain
relatively commonplace, with a fair degree of rural
processing. In those countries registered GI systems are
on the whole also well established.19 Some Central
European states also favour the "expansionist" agenda,
such as Hungary (to join the European Union on May
18 Nonetheless a number of other member countries (so-
called "Friends of GIs") have joined in calling for greater GI
protection: e.g. Switzerland, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, India, etc. As
to the history of debate concerning GIs in the context of TRIPs,
see e.g. also F. Addor and A. Grazioli, "Geographical indications
beyond wines and spirits" (2002) 5/6 Journal of World Intellectual
Property 865; and also Vivas-Eugui, n. 1 above.
19 This is not the case for all EU countries. Before 1992 the
northern Member States did not have registration systems, rely-
ing on legislation relating to misleading and deceptive conduct.
This caused some difficulty, since these states did not dispose of
established lists from which to notify names to the Commission
when Council Regulation 2081/92 came into force.
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14, 2004) and Bulgaria. Certain developing countries
also favour extension of registered Gls to cover prod-
ucts other than wine, with some of the interest going
beyond foodstuffs and into handicrafts and other forms
of localised small-scale industrial production.
Farming and agriculture in the European Union are
highly regulated, protected and subsidised activities.
The level of state and Union involvement with agri-
culture naturally results in the Union giving consider-
able weight to agriculture-related issues in trade
negotiations. However, currently there is a trend
towards attempting to reduce European agriculture’s
reliance on forms of production and export subsidisa-
tion. One must be conscious, when considering the
position taken by the European Union in relation to
registered GIs, of the direct and indirect links that exist
between registered GIs and wider agricultural policy. In
terms of agricultural policy, high-level registered GI
systems can be said to promote small-scale rural pro-
duction, the elimination of overproduction, mainte-
nance of artisanal production methods, and hence rural
income and population, and existing environments.
From this perspective, increasing protection of GIs in
export markets around the world can be seen as promis-
ing ever greater returns to local producers.
On the other side of the debate stand certain "new
world" countries that have agricultural sectors with
some or all of the following characteristics: lower levels
of agricultural subsidisation; export orientation; econo-
mies of scale in agri-industries; higher levels of corpo-
rate control of production; and common adoption of
European geographical terms, in some cases as generic
product descriptors. These states, among which Aus-
tralia is prominent, tend to oppose expansion of the
registered GI system.2° They are concerned that
increased GI protection has protectionist overtones,
and that it will disadvantage them in the development of
agricultural export trade into certain third country mar-
kets, as well as imposing onerous compliance obliga-
tions. They are also unconvinced of the inherent
benefits in domestic economic terms of increased GI
protection, pointing, inter alia, to the sufficiency of
existing remedies for misuse of reputation, and the con-
siderable regulatory and fiscal costs involved. Countries
such as the United States also strongly advocate the
maintenance of prior trade mark rights, both on the
basis of the inviolability of private property rights and
the need for compensation if prior trade marks were to
be effectively expropriated because of subsequent GI
registrations.
The expansionist position
While agricultural policy related motives may remain
largely in the background, the expansionist position
openly invokes a combination of historical and theoret-
ical arguments. Fundamental is the view that it is not
20 See WTO IP/C/W/133/Rev.1: proposal from Canada,
Chile, Japan, and the United States; and the proposal presented
to the TRIPs Council’s Special Session, September 2002, by 17
members including the United States and Canada, and Australia
and New Zealand--see WTO IP/C/W/386 (relating to Art.23);
see also WTO IP/C/W/360, Implications of Article 23 Extension
(Communication from Australia, Canada, etc.), July 26, 2002.
because others have over time "got away with" using
geographical terms to describe products originating
outside the relevant area that they should be entitled to
continue to do so in the future. The whole history of the
protection of GIs has been marked by a geographical
expansion of the struggle to confine the right to use
terms to the region designated: to recapture lost GIs.
The TRIPs-related demands are simply the logical next
step in the context of more integrated world trade, a
step that will further repair historical wrongs.21 But the
protection for pre-existing trade marks and generics
remains a perceived drawback which TRIPs negotia-
tions concerning expansion and the multilateral register
do not directly address. This continues to offend EU
interests: geographical indications identify real and
existing places, and inhabitants should not be deprived
of their inherent right to use their place names in rela-
tion to their products. They should not become victims
of their own success by the protection of others’ rights
to use European place-names under the guise of gen-
ericness. Moreover, the rights of foreign trade mark
owners whose marks incorporate a regional name
should not prevail over the rights of regional GI users.
Nonetheless, even if in theory all GIs should ulti-
mately be "reinstated", the exigencies of international
trade negotiations have compelled acceptance of a com-
promise. Hence certain exceptions (pre-existing regis-
tered trade marks, generic geographical terms)2a have
become established in the TRIPs context. This does not
mean there is no room for "improvement" (i. e. circum-
venting TRIPs exceptions): to some degree within
TRIPs through the mechanics of the multilateral regis-
ter; through the agriculture negotiations; or through
bilateral agreements, of which the EU-Australi~ Wine
Agreement is an example. Therefore a two-pronged
approach, on the one hand, striving for expansion of
protection within TRIPs, and on the other hand,
enhancing protection even beyond TRIPs standards
through agriculture negotiations and country-specific
agreements, is crucial to Europe’s determined effort to
regain comprehensive control of its geographic terms in
agricultural trade in the future.
However, in the next stage of expansion of protection
of registered GIs, more is required in a multilateral
forum than determination and appeals to fairness or an
obligation to repair historic injustices. As suggested
above, one factor in gaining acceptance in the broad
church of the WTO lies in the support that may be
garnered for domestic registered GI protection from
countries that do not already have it. Such countries
would likely be less willing to support higher GI protec-
tion if the overwhelming beneficiary is only Europe, and
if the domestic policy advantages of GI registration
(going beyond wine) are not apparently universal.
21 This historical dimension particularly holds true for the
European Union. Certain developing nations favour expansion
for different reasons, mainly related to the opportunity to regain
control of certain terms now commonly used, or otherwise
related to perceived advantages for certain sectors (including
traditional crafts) or the aspiration to use GI registration to
protect traditional knowledge; see further Vivas-Eugui, n.1
above.
22 The exceptions of Art.24(4)-(9) are commonly referred to
as the "acquired rights" exceptions.
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The minimalist position
The minimalist position turns the historical argument
on its head and stresses that there is no point in closing
the stable door now the horse has bolted. The use of
European GIs in many of the immigrant countries of
the new world is the result of historical accident, and
not of deliberate misappropriation in bad faith. Many
GIs and associated cropping and production processes
were introduced by migrants naming colonial locations
after their place of birth, or continuing to use customary
geogra~hical terms to describe certain products. In the
perception of consumers in such countries, many GIs
have lost their connection with a certain region in a
country of origin.23 Furthermore, for many years-
although this is not universally the case: think of Cham-
pagne, for example--GIs remained largely unclaimed
and unprotected outside Europe, so European coun-
tries are arguably estopped from claiming them back. A
fortiori trade mark owners’ private ownership rights
should not be usurped or expropriated.
It is also argued that it is unconscionable to set up a
global system of GI registration which is potentially so
disproportionate in its benefits. In contrast with other
IP regimes such as copyright or patents, registered GI
systems are not widespread outside Europe--as is illus-
trated by low adherence levels to relevant international
treaties, mainly the 1958 Lisbon Agreement. Member
countries, to comply with international obligations, par-
ticipate in the proposed multilateral register system, and
derive domestic economic benefit, would in effect have
to establish systems that protect both foreign and local
GIs. This would in fact advantage Europe, with its long-
standing investment in protection regimes and long tra-
dition of rural branding and regulation. Other member
countries would either never benefit, or only benefit
after considerable investments have been made to inter-
nationally promote local GIs, as yet unlranown, in export
markets. Rather, in the newly found spirit of WTO and
TRIPs, members should aim to establish a system that
does not distribute benefits unevenly over Member
States, but that holds genuine promise of trade liberal-
isation and domestic growth for all country members.
Opponents of registered GI systems point out that
they are not without viable alternatives. If the essential
task of GIs is as a vehicle for the promotion of value-
added rural production, there are other options with
marked advantages, whether it be certification or col-
lective marks, or even ordinary trade marks (corporate
branding) .24 These alternatives have many of the advan-
tages of OI protection without some of the draw-
backs.2~
23 See e.g. the Spanish Champagne (Freixenet) decision in
Australia: Comird Inrerprofessionel du Vin de Champagne v NL
Burton Pry Lrd (1981) 57 EL.R. 434.
¯ 24 As to certification marks in general, see J. Belson, "Certifi-
cation Marks, Guarantees and Trusts" [2002] E.I.RR. 340.
25 In terms of public cost, rigidity and dependency on com-
mensurate rural and agricultural policy settings. Much is made
of the issue of cost in the WTO Communication emanating from
Australia, Canada, etc. (WTO IP/C/W/360; see n.20 above), in
particular, that a registered GI system tends to impose costs and
administrative burdens on states rather than on private actors, as
is the case with trade marks.
These arguments are inherently inconclusive, even if
they generally point towards the need for synchronicity
between decisions concerning registered GIs and
broader agricultural policy. As argued above, ultimately
the essential question is what the domestic advantages
are of introducing a system of registered GIs, and fur-
thermore what forms such a system should take. More
progress can be made from attempting to identify the
theoretical basis for introducing a registered GI system.
This will assist in determining whether a country might
wish to adopt such a system if it is not already estab-
lished, and hence the position it might take in inter-
national negotiations.
The Theoretical Case for G! Registration
Registered GIs as intellectual property26
As a form of intellectual property, registered GIs con-
stitute proprietary protection for reputation.27 The
goals of GI registration are thus analogous to those of
trade mark registration. In other words, registration
allows a priori determination of legal entitlement, with
subsequent savings in terms of transaction costs, both
in the context of licensing and assignment, and in the
context of dispute resolution. Registration obviates the
need, within certain parameters, to prove ownership
when a dispute arises, as well as the need to prove
reputation and deception of consumers. A registration
system also presents search cost advantages for rival
traders, who can more simply determine whether a cer-
tain sign is available for use as a promotional tool or not.
Thus legal protection for signs promotes efficiencies in
the industrial organisation of the production and pro-
motion of goods.
26 As to general analysis of the policy issues underlying GI
registration see, inter alia, D. Rangnekars, "Geographical Indica-
tions, A review of Proposals at the TRIPS Council: extending
article 23 to products other than wines and spirits", UNCTAD/
ICTSD, May 2003; OECD, Directorate for Food, Agriculture
and Fisheries; Trade Directorate, "Appellations of origin and
geographical indications in OECD member countries: Eco-
nomic and Legal implications", OM/AGR/APM/TD/WP(2000)
15/FINAL; R J. Heald, "Trademarks and Geographical Indica-
tions: Exploring the Contours of the TRIPS Agreement" (1996)
29 Vand J. Transnat’l L. 635; and WIPO Symposium on the
International Protection of Geographical Indications in the
Worldwide Context, Hungary October 1997; South Africa, Sep-
tember 1999; Montevideo November 2001. For more extensive
consideration of policy issues relating to GIs see also W. van
Caenegem, "Registered Geographical Indications: Between
Intellectual Property and Rural Policy" (2003) J.W.I.R Pt I
Vol.6/5: 699; Pt II Vol.6/6: 861.
27 The analysis below is in part based on W. M. Landes and R.
A. Posner, "Trademark law: an economic perspective" (1987)
30 J. of Law & Eco. 265; N. Economides, "The Economics of
Trademarks" (1988) 78 Trademark Reporter 523; S.L. Carter,
"The Trouble with Trademark" (1990) 99 Yale Law Journal 759;
M. Davis, "Death of a salesman’s doctrine: a critical look at
trademark use" (1985) 19/2 Georgia Law Review 233; W. Moran,
"Rural space as intellectual property" (1993) 12 Political Geog-
raphy 263; W. Moran, "Wine appellations as territory in France
and California" (1993) 83/4 Annals of the Association of American
Geographers 694-717 at 695; and N. Dawson, "Locating geo-
graphical indications--perspectives from English law" (2000) 90
Trademark Reporter 590.
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At a more general level, GI registration, like trade
marks, may effect a search cost reduction for consum-
ers. The information asymmetry between buyer and
seller is overcome by the legal protection of the sign by
which consumers can recognise the qualities of experi-
ence goods (i.e. goods whose characteristics cannot be
tested on purchase) emanating from the owner of the
mark. At a more basic level, registration promotes diver-
sification in industrial production: in the absence of
legal protection for reputed signs, producers of non-
testable goods would not supply diversified and distinct
products at higher cost, because of the inability to cap-
ture higher returns. Competitors would imitate the sign
and attach it to goods of lesser quality produced at
lower cost, so the incentive to produce differentiated
goods in the first place would be reduced.
GI registration systems thus support investment in
the production and promotion of diversified rural and
agricultural products. This could also be done by way of
ordinary trade marks, but there is a crucial distinction
in this regard: GI registration protects the reputation of
actual places as represented by their actual names,
whereas trade mark registration is only available for fic-
titious or fanciful terms that do not describe any aspect
of the goods, including their geographical origin. This
renders a system of registered GIs less dynamic than
registered trade marks. The law recognises that the lat-
ter potentially pass from the private domain into com-
mon language through the process of genericisation;
this cannot be the case for registered GIs.
Another crucial distinction is that registered GIs are
collectively rather than privately owned, which requires
greater regulation to ensure that the behaviour of each
owner will not damage the overall reputation of the
relevant term. Furthermore, because geographical der-
ivation alone does not necessarily guarantee consistency
in product characteristics, registered GI systems, such as
the European high-level model, additionally impose
detailed product standards to guarantee such consis-
tency. This ensures that consumers are not misled by the
use of a GI, and assists in maintaining the value of a
registered GI over time, in terms of consumer goodwill.
Finally, a claim to uniqueness is sometimes made in
relation to agricultural products, to support the argu-
ment that mere reliance on general actions against mis-
representation is not adequate. From this perspective,
the terroir and human characteristics of an area imbue a
product with such unique and inimitable qualities that
any use of the term in relation to products emanating
from outside the area is ipso facto a misrepresentation.
Such goods cannot, by definition, have the same char-
acteristics. Sceptics dispute this and argue that most
products associated with a certain region can in fact
perfectly well be imitated and produced elsewhere: geo-
graphical characteristics are rarely truly unique, and
production techniques are readily copied.
Agricultural policy
Thus a legitimate system of registered OIs that is to
fulfil its purpose of protecting local reputation and reli-
ably informing consumers concerning product charac-
teristics requires proof and preservation of a real
connection with a geographic area, and arguably also
observance of product standards, as enshrined in
express regulations and specifications.28 However, a
system that imposes the resultant strict controls on agri-
cultural production is quite clearly an instrument of
agricultural policy. It tends to prefer established, small-
scale methods of rural production over alternative land
uses and production methods. Thus it potentially
results in detrimental rigidities of production and sup-
ply, and additional costs in terms of inflexibility to com-
pete by innovation. Inconsistencies in agricultural
production levels cannot be alleviated by admixture
with produce from outside the delineated area, nor can
fluctuations in demand be adequately met. Since prod-
uct standards are set, inter alia, by requiring the applica-
tion of certain production methods, there is a brake on
innovation both at the level of production technology
and at the level of experimentation with alternative
crops or varieties.
As a result, the desirability of GI registration tends to
depend on the industrial and agricultural policy con-
text. As a general rule, the potential economic benefits
of registered GIs are most apparent where established
industries in rural areas adhere to traditional methods
and established crop choices, have maintained geo-
graphic integrity and have an established reputation. If
a government is intent on maintaining the rural status
quo on the basis of territorial preferences, established
ownership patterns and protection of established crop-
ping and production methods, stringent GI registration
may be one tool that can be used to this end. By con-
trast, the system is less attractive compared to the use of
registered trade marks as corporate brands, or certifica-
tion marks, where there is no such small-scale rural
production, entrenched by tradition, regulation~and fis-
cal policy. If general policy settings reflect the fact that
the structure of rural industry fluctuates over time, crop
choices are unsettled, innovation and flexibility are
established tools of rural policy, private land ownership
is not strictly controlled, and agriculture is not heavily
subsidised or protected, then registered GIs make much
less sense.
Alternatives to registered GIs
GI registration is not the only tool available to promote
rural goodwill, and the introduction of such a system
will undoubtedly create significant costs, short-term
dislocation, inefficiencies and disputes, as territories are
delineated and production methods determined. In
other words, maintenance of rural employment and
value adding, together with limiting overproduction,29
are well-accepted policy goals--but high-level regis-
tered GI systems are not necessarily the best way to
28 Arguably guaranteeing geographical origin alone is not suf-
ficient to ensure consistent product quality. Some countries
might wish to adopt the strategy of ex officio registration of cer-
tain well-known GIs. Note that under EU Council Regulation
2081/92 no ex officio registration is possible: applications must
ultimately originate with producers.
29 Note that the link between GI protection and limiting over-
production has always been strong; it is expressed in relevant EU
documents (e.g. in the Preamble to Council Regulation 2081/92:
"Whereas, as part of the adjustment of the common agricultural
policy the diversification of agricultural production should be
encouraged so as to achieve a better balance between supply and
demand on the markets").
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achieve this goal in every country. It may also be the
case that the approach in the European Union, which
recognises registration of GIs as a method for the limit-
ing of production levels, is not appropriate in other
countries, where governments seek the expansion of
rural production!3°
For many it will be more effective to rely on corporate
branding strategies, as well as combating consumer
deception as to origin by way of actions against mis-
representation, and/or reliance on collective or certifica-
tion marks. This will maintain the necessary flexibility
in industrial organisation, and an ability to innovate and
compete at a more limited cost to the community. Pro-
moting reliance on corporate brands, registered trade
marks and collective and certification marks for such
industries is more in tune with a liberal market economy
based on private rights; GI registration systems are pub-
lic rather than private in nature.31
Cost: delineation and enforcement
There is little doubt that the setting up of a domestic
register of GIs is an expensive undertaking both for the
public purse and for business. As was argued above, a
legitimate GI registration system should ensure con-
sistent product standards and a close geographical con-
nection. This requires complex determination of
specifications and enforcement.3z Even the more simple
system, requiring only geographic delineation without
separate product standards, such as for wines in Aus-
tralia, requires considerable resources. Bureaucracies at
various levels are necessary to determine whether a GI
should be registered and under what conditions, and
furthermore to supervise adherence to the specifica-
tions underlying granted GIs. Organisation at the pro-
ducer level is also required. The advantage, if any,
gained by having a system of registered GIs is countered
30 See e.g. Council Regulation 823187: (L84/59) which states
that a framework of Community rules concerning quality wine
production should be adopted, inter alia "to avoid an uncon-
trollable extension of the production of such wines . . . ".
31 There are ample examples, for instance in the wine indus-
~y, where ordinary trade marks have been used to great effect to
promote the sales of quality products and command a price
differential, while maintaining consistent quality, high levels of
innovation and flexibility in production and marketing strate-
gies.
32 It should be noted, for instance, that appeals and judicial
determination of disputes must be catered for. This is a cost that
is partly spread across the community, but also fails heavily on
the shoulders of the agricultural sector. The history of the mak-
ing of determinations in France provides a salutary lesson: the
process takes many years, in a variety of fora, and many disputes,
are ongoing. Decisions about delimitation are commonly
appealed (on this and other characteristics of the French system
of GI registration; see N. Olszak, Des appellations d’origine et
indications de provenance, Tec&Doc (2001)). The younger system
in Australia has already engendered protracted disputes about
delimitation (as to the Australian system in general, see S. Stern
and C. Fund, "The Australian System of Registration and Pro-
tection of Geographical Indications for Wines" (2000) 511 Flin-
dersJournal of Law Reform). On the other side of the ledger, it has
been argued that GI registration will save legitimate users the
considerable costs of proving reputation and misrepresentation
in each case. However, this may be true if one compares regis-
tered GIs to common law marks; it is not the case if an ordinary,
certification or collective mark is registered instead of a GI. So
there is an establishment cost for the system as a whole, and
transaction costs involved with the operation of the system.
by the financial cost of the system, borne by agricultural
producers, but also by taxpayers at large. There is also
the potential short-term readjustment cost to consider if
international obligations require relinquishment of
established uses of certain terms, as occurred in relation
to feta cheese in the European Union.
Cost: promoting registered GIs
Like other forms of intellectual property, registered GIs
do not constitute their own reward. Investment is
required to build their reputation, by way of protection,
promotion and advertising. In a competitive market the
cost will be considerable, and will offset the increased
returns from differentiation. This is the case in the
domestic market, and also at the international level. In
countries without an established tradition of GI regis-
tration, it may well be that regional reputation is not a
common marketing tool, or that regional names have
become genericised and are in general or indiscriminate
use. This may pre-empt registration in the first place,
but if registration is still possible, it will require a con-
siderable investment in consumer re-education.
In terms of exports, some terms that have an estab-
lished reputation in export markets, or where registra-
tion via the mooted multilateral register offers a chance
of regaining some control over goodwill, may benefit
from increased protection in the future. However, where
a country has few or no GIs with a foreign reputation, it
faces the arduous and expensive task of building up such
a reputation overseas. There is a considerable distinction
between regaining some control over internationally
well-known GIs, to whose recognition imitators may
well have contributed over the years, and developing a
profitable reputation for the future for relatively
unknown or at present non-existent GIs.
Building goodwill is obviously expensive but will also
take time. Benefits in increased returns from differen-
tiation will be for the future and subject to considerable
risk and uncertainty. There is thus a serious question
whether the short-term costs of establishing the system
should be traded off in favour of uncertain long-term
benefits. Even for well-known GIs such as Champagne,
the cost of promotion and protection of the name
around the world is very considerable. A premium price
may offset these costs, but developers of new GIs would
have to invest heavily before any premium returns could
be commanded. It will take a long time before the
increased costs of product differentiation on the basis of
GIs will be recovered by increased price differentials. In
any case, is there any advantage in investing in promo-
tion of such registered GIs rather than of corporate
brands or certification marks?
Existing trade mark rights and homonyms
A further cost that a member country adopting a regis-
tered GI system may face is the need to align new regis-
tered GIs with pre-existing rights, in particular trade
mark rights. This would be the case both if inclusion on
a multilateral register could be opposed on the basis of
prior domestic trade marks--as Hungary has proposed,
but not the European Union--or if GIs on the multi-
lateral register came to prevail over domestic trade
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marks. This is a complex process both at the domestic
level and in relation to the implementation of potential
multilateral obligations. A difficult issue arises in rela-
tion to existing trade marks which incorporate foreign
registered GIs. Although TRIPs envisages exceptions in
that regard, if under a future multilateral register system
or now under the pre-emption proposals in the WTO
agriculture negotiations, GIs came to prevail over cer-
tain domestic trade marks, there may be associated
costs of expropriation and compensation.33
In countries with European languages and that have
adopted certain European place-names, the further reg-
ulatory complication of homonyms must also be con-
sidered.34
Opportunity cost: weighing up alternatives
The arguments advanced above must be considered in
the light of the available alternatives. Even if one accepts
that there are sufficient advantages in a proprietary sys-
tem applying to rural reputation, rather than simply
relying on actions for unfair competition and the like, a
registered GI system along European lines is not the
only option.
One alternative is a low-level version of GI registra-
tion, in particular, one that only requires certification of
geographical origins, and not adherence to product
standards. From the discussion above it will be clear
that such a system arguably lacks legitimacy because
consistency of product characteristics and qualities can-
not be as reliably guaranteed, and there is a risk of
dilution of overall reputation by the actions of one or
more individual users of the GI. On the other hand,
such a system still retains the advantage of reducing
transaction costs by clearly delineating geographical
boundaries a priori and erga omnes. Whether or not a
producer from a contiguous location is entitled to use
the name will not have to be determined in the context
of litigation, with the associated costs and uncertainties.
As well as having the advantage of lower costs of imple-
mentation and control, because of the absence of prod-
uct standards, it is a ready way in which protected
foreign registered GIs can be incorporated domesti-
cally, if multilateral international obligations so
require.
Another alternative is reliance on certification marks.
Various WTO Member States favour this approach,
since it allows either or both geographical origin and
product standards to be certified in a manner analogous
to registered GIs. However, it is not a prescriptive state
system, in that the adoption and regulation of such
33 See in this regard, Addor and Grazioli (n.18 above), who
argue that registration of a geographic name as a mark allows the
mark owner a free ride on the reputation of the GI incorporating
the geographic name concerned (at p.872). It should be remem-
bered though that a trade mark could not be registered if it is
confusing or deceptive. However, Addor and Grazioli argue that
nonetheless GIs should be given preference over registered trade
marks seemingly also if the GI did not have a reputation in the
relevant jurisdiction at the time of registration of the mark. In
other words, GIs should always trump registered trade marks,
rather than a first in time rule applying.
34 The issue of homonyms is dealt with in TRIPs in Art.23(3),
which sets up a conditional coexistence regime.
marks is purely a matter for individual producers. Certi-
fication marks are not an instrument of state interven-
tion in rural and agricultural production, and are more
consistent with a private enterprise and private owner-
ship philosophy. The principal distinction in terms of
the scope of legal rights is that certification or collective
marks are subiect to the same rules as other marks,
usually with the exception of rules relating to non-use.
In other words, whereas registered GIs are not normally
subiect to such exceptions as genericness or use in good
faith, certification (and collective) marks are.
Trade Negotiations and the introduction of
Registered GI Systems
All the issues canvassed above are significant in assess-
ing domestically benefits that might flow from institut-
ing new or increased GI protection. National
agricultural policies and conditions are a crucial factor.
But Member States might also calculate that conces-
sions on GIs could be traded off for increased access to
foreign markets for agricultural products, a crucial
international trade issue.35 Furthermore, they might
hope to regain control over some domestic geographical
or associated terms whose use has spread around the
world, and which enjoy consumer recognition, even if
they are at present beyond the control of local claimants
(either because of genericness or because of foreign
unrelated trade mark registrations). Be that as it may,
the consequences that may flow from adopting the EU
proposals in the TRIPs Council need to be carefully
considered. Some of those consequences are canvassed
below, and the agriculture negotiations are considered
subsequently.                               ~
WTO/TRIPs negotiations: EU proposals
The model the European Union has advanced for a
multilateral register for wines provides for what
amounts to automatic inclusion by notification from
national or regional registers. Legitimacy of incorpora-
tion on the multilateral register is derived from the
underlying national or regional registration. Notified
terms would not be re-examined for conformity with
the TRIPs definition or inherent falsity. The onus in
relation to eligibility for protection in a Member State
rests on that Member State itself. Motivated challenges
against incorporation on the multilateral register by
member countries, if sustained, would mean the term
concerned does not enioy special protection in the chal-
lenging country, but would not affect its status in other
countries. Challenges would have to be lodged within a
very narrow time frame of 18 months.3~ This would
35 Some have argued that Australia’s decision to abandon the
use of European wine GIs was vindicated by improved access to
European markets for products of the vine. However, others do
not agree, arguing that the concessions in the EU (EC)--Aus-
tralia Wine Agreement 1994, in terms of access to European
markets, were small, consisting of relatively insignificant meas-
ures relating to oenological practices. New Zealand did not enter
an analogous agreement with the European Union.
36 A fairly extensive and scaled dispute resolution mechanism
would be provided, involving initial negotiations and arbitration
if required, without altering the applicability of general dispute
mechanisms in WTO/TRIPs.
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create a processing bottleneck in Member States if a
very large number of notifications from existing regis-
ters must be examined with a view to possible chal-
lenges on the initial establishment of the multilateral
register, although it may be a reasonable time frame
once initial notifications have been dealt with and the
multilateral register has been consolidated.37
Absent a successful challenge, an obligation would
arise in every member country to grant the wine GI the
protection required by TRIPs.3a This would have con-
siderable repercussions in terms of domestic examina-
tion with a view to possible challenges, and compliance
mechanisms. If what is proposed in relation to wine
becomes the model applicable to all other foodstuffs or
goods in the future, the implications grow exponen-
tially.39 As well, the resolution mechanism relating to
disputed challenges is fairly onerous, costs being pre-
sumably borne by the states concerned.
Thus the case for adoption of a multilateral register
without further examination and with a heavy onus on
member countries to challenge within a narrow time
frame is arguably questionable. A multilateral register
will indeed have some benefits for member countries
that can transfer GI registrations,4° but given the multi-
farious nature of existing and mooted systems, any
inclusion on the multilateral register should arguably be
subject to examination in terms of its conformity with
the TRIPs definition and requirements. This would be
preferable to leaving the onus of disproving conformity
on opposing members. It may be that, instead of every
term being individually re-examined, each regional or
country registration system should be examined for
conformity with the TRIPs requirements before auto-
matic notification of terms from that register to the
multilateral register is accepted.41 If a challenge is
lodged by a member country on the basis that the GI
does not conform to the TRIPS definition, the present
EU proposal only requires that all Member States be
37 As to the grounds for a challenge, see nn.14 and 15
above.
38 There is a lack of clarity in the EU Proposal and in the
Chairman’s note in relation to the obligations that would fall on
Member States that do not participate in the system. Although
participation in the multilateral register is presented as optional
in the EU proposal, this seems to apply wholly to the right to
notify GIs to the multilateral register, but only partly to legal
obligations on member countries, since some legal consequences
would apparently result even for countries that did not partici-
pate.
39 After all, there can be little doubt that the model adopted in
relation to the multilateral register for wines will be the model
employed for all other foodstuffs if expansion of higher-level
protection beyond just wine comes about: this is also the regis-
tration model that currently operates in Europe under Regula-
tion 2081/92. There would be no logic, other than the logic of
compromise, to permanently distinguish between wine and
other agricultural products.
40 Notably in reducing costs of enforcement, and uncertainty
for GI owners in foreign markets.
41 Arguably there would not be a difficulty with existing Euro-
pean regional and member country registration schemes. When
it comes to registration models that other countries may be
tempted to introduce, there may be more difficulty in establish-
ing that the desire to regain control over certain terms in inter-
national markets is tempered by compliance with the actual
TRIPs definitional requirements. A further question is whether
certification marks registration should be a basis for inclusion in
the multilateral register.
informed; maybe it should instead have some legal
effect erga ornrtes, certainly where non-conformity with
the TRIPs definition is concerned.42 But the major
alternative is far simpler: to leave it to domestic courts
to determine in individual cases whether some ground
of invalidity exists, rather than to require member coun-
tries to lodge and pursue oppositions to multilateral
registration a priori.
Any proposal for a multilateral register should not
pre-empt a Member State’s freedom to consider its
domestic interests in relation to GI registration. A coun-
try may opt not to participate because it concludes that
a domestic registration system is not an attractive
option for broader policy reasons, and without domestic
registration it cannot benefit from the multilateral regis-
ter. Alternatively, it may be because it sees little poten-
tial for gaining control over its geographical terms
already in use in export markets, owing to TRIPs trade
mark and genericness exceptions. If there is no clarity of
choice in terms of participation, then the register should
not have any direct legal effect, and be restricted to a
database of relevant information.43 Countries should be
able to continue to comply by observing current TRIPs
obligations, by providing options to individual foreign
GI owners, i.e. the right to either obtain a sui generis
foreign GI registration, a registered GI if such a register
exists, or a certification or collective mark.44
TRIPs and bilateral negotiations
For countries without an existing GI registration system
or with no significant domestic GI registrations, sup-
port for a more minimalist position in WTO4~ might be
combined with bilateral negotiations withJ;other coun-
tries. In that way individual countries can assess the
value of a bargain offered in terms of reciprocal protec-
tion of some specific geographic terms of their own.
Whereas negotiated outcomes within the WTO TRIPs
context will probably remain subject to genericness and
trade mark priority (the European Union’s contrary
proposal notwithstanding), both sides might benefit
42 The EU proposal does not make it clear what happens if a
challenge is not resolved by negotiation or is resolved in favour of
the challenger (see nn.14 and 15 above). The Chairman’s Note
(see n. 15 above) provides various options one of which requires
that a successful challenge on the basis of non-conformity be
notified to all member countries, whereas a successful challenge
on another (country-specific) basis would result in an annotation
of the register. See in this regard also the communication by
Hungary IP/C/W/234 providing input on the opposition/chal-
lenge procedure in the multilateral register.
43 See the "Database" proposal put forward by the United
States, etc.: WTO/IP/C/W/133/Rev. 1 : "Proposal for a multilat-
eral system for notification and registration of geographical indi-
cations based on Article 23.4 of the TRIPs agreement"
(Communication from Canada, Chile, Japan and the United
States), July 26, 1999.
44 By sui generis GI registration is meant a system which pro-
vides only for the protection of foreign terms, in conformity with
the requirements of some international agreement. Sui generis
registration might run along Malaysian lines (see n.6 above), i.e.
including a list with amendments to trade practices or fair trad-
ing legislation singling out listed GIs for preferential treatment in
terms of proof of deception, etc.
45 i.e. the "Database proposal", see n.43 above.
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from overcoming these restraints by bilateral agree-
ments--which TRIPs allows.46 Alternatively they could
join in the haggling over terms in the agriculture
negotiations.
However, there is a risk that bilateral agreements
foreclose third markets to non-contracting countries,
which would be contrary to the spirit of TRIPs, global
trade liberalisation and a level playing field. Bilateral
negotiations for higher levels of protection for GIs for
food and wine should therefore, as a general rule, not
result in unfairly constraining the entry into a contract-
ing country of similarly named generic equivalents from
a third country.47
GIs, trade liberalisation and "ambit claims"
It is significant that TRIPs, as part of WTO, is intended
as an instrument of trade liberalisation, and not of dis-
guised protectionism. The harmonisation process
which is TRIPs is aimed at enhancing trade in legit-
imate intangibles or goods incorporating intangibles.
However, because of GI registration’s close association
with agricultural trade, there is a risk, maybe greater
than with other areas of intellectual property law, that
creeping expansion of GI regulation will come to con-
stitute a barrier to trade rather than levelling the playing
field for legitimate commerce.
Analogising with trade mark law clarifies this point.
Trade mark law comprises balancing mechanisms to
ensure that registration does not become an obstacle to
legitimate trade. For that reason, descriptive terms, or
terms that have become generic, do not fall or remain
within the monopoly power of a trade mark owner.
Other traders are free to carry on legitimate business
under them.48 Courts have applied this principle in a
fairly robust manner, developing techniques to distin-
guish between descriptive and distinctive terms.49
However, when it comes to registered GIs, geograph-
ical terms once registered cannot become generic or
descriptive. The perpetual nature of the rights requires
that stringent a priori conditions are imposed, because
otherwise GI registration has the potential to disrupt
legitimate trade,s°
TNS means that ambit claims that do not relate to
actual place names should be treated with caution; the
46 This could be combined with a demand for inclusion of
foreign GIs on the EU Register, which is not currently possible,
unless permitted under a bilateral agreement and on the basis of
equivalence.
47 More specifically, if the geographic name is either generic or
unknown prior to the entry into the bilateral agreement; and it is
generic in the non-contracting country of export; and if the sale
of the goods does not constitute a misrepresentation as to the
true origin of the goods (or rules to the same effect), then argu-
ably it should not be included in a bilateral agreement.
48 This does not apply only to word marks, but also to devices
or to other signs.
49 The significance of the principle is underlined in the aca-
demic literature; see, inter alia, S. L. Garter and Landes and
Posner, n.27 above. Some theorists have gone beyond the self-
evident proposition that nobody should be allowed to monopo-
lise ordinary descriptive language, and developed an "economics
of language" framework, giving further theoretical support to
this established legal principle.
50 This reflects a cardinal rule in IP law in general: the more
absolute the form of protection, the higher the threshold to
obtain such protection should be.
perpetual nature of the right cannot then be linked to
the perpetual nature of a place and its name. It is there-
fore imperative that claims to monopolise "indirect
GIs", traditional expressions including container
shapes, varietal names, label shapes and the like be
treated as a very distinct category of case. While the
case for universal strong registered GI protection for
place names is already a difficult one to make out, it
becomes almost impossible in all but the most irrefuta-
ble cases where indirect or associated terms and signs
are concerned. Aforriori this applies in relation to "tra-
ditional expressions".5~ It is also important that, as well
as at the multinational level, in the context of bilateral
negotiations countries assess very carefully whether it is
in their interest to accept proprietary rights in such
terms, signs or shapes for the future.
The genericness exception in TRIPs
A country may well be tempted to favour GI registra-
tion because of the apparent prospect of regaining con-
trol over certain direct or indirect GIs that are well
known in multiple jurisdictions. Notorious but spec-
ulative examples include Darjeeling tea and Basmati
rice.~2 However, here the genericness exception found
in TRIPs may well be to such countries’ detriment,
even if domestic registration of the terms would accord
with the TRIPs definition. Because of the genericness
exception, domestic and consequent multilateral regis-
tration of a GI will have no effect in a potential export
market where it is a generic term. This could be the case
in significant export markets such as the United States
and Australia, which show little inclination to surrender
what they consider to be generic terms. The EU system
does not allow for registration of generic terms, and at
present does not accept non-EU registrations.53 As well,
51 These concerns are also significant in the context of design-
ing a system of international registration if it is based on a
principle of automatic translation of entries on national or
regional registers to the multilateral register. It must be the case
that the more doubtful peripheries of legal protection should be
excised from a multilateral register: only the clearest cases relat-
ing to actual geographical names should be included. We have
seen that Greece has been successful in prohibiting descriptive
use of the word "feta", which is not a geographical name, but,
under EU law, an "indirect GI" (i.e. in terms of Art.2.3 Regula-
tion 2081/92: "Certain traditional geographical or non-geo-
graphical names designating an agricultural product or a
foodstuff originating in a region or a specific place"). The impact
of restraints on the use of Traditional Expressions (TEs) would
be even greater. By way of example, the Czech Republic would
like to see the term "pilsner" follow the same path, Italy the word
"parmesan" and Spain "sherry". Other examples are the terms
vino, tawny, ruby, and oloroso. Note JOB(03)/51 Communica-
tion from Australia, "Traditional Expressions" (March 6, 2003).
It should be noted, however, that the European Union has made
it clear that it does not seek to see TEs included in the multi-
lateral register: see WTO JOB(03)/76, Council for TRIPs Spe-
cial Session, April 23, 2003, "Traditional Expressions:
Communication from the EU".
52 See D. Downes and S. Laird, "Innovative mechanisms for
sharing benefits of biodiversity and related knowledge: Case
studies on Geographical Indications and trademarks", Prepared
for UNCTAD Biotrade Initiative (1999).
53 See, however, n.46 above.
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recovery of GIs in foreign markets may possibly be
barred by prior trade mark rights.
There is a converse argument in relation to generic-
ness: countries that may domestically benefit from a
genericness exception in relation to foreign registered
GIs (e.g. Australia would be able to continue to use the
term feta in its domestic market as a generic term), may
find that they do not benefit from it in third-country
export markets.54 In those markets the term might not
be generic, or it might have been surrendered in a bilat-
eral agreement. This could result in an important
impediment to agricultural exports into such third
countries. 55
WTO agriculture negotiations
Overcoming the TRIPs exceptions in relation to GIs is
a long-standing ambition of the European Union, in
particular in specific cases where foreign trade mark
registrations are seen to preclude entry into markets by
EU suppliers under their own regional names. The
introduction of a demand for pre-emption of certain
terms in the agriculture negotiations thus comes as no
surprise.~6 TRIPs limitations are avoided by a forum
shift. This some WTO members vigorously oppose.
The move is not easily reconciled with the established
and elaborate GI agenda within TRIPs. Be that as it
may, it is attractive to the European Union, as it would
see established markets for products now supplied by
foreign trade mark owners or under generic GIs effec-
tively transferred to European suppliers. The legitimacy
of such transfers, certainly where goodwill or recogni-
tion has actually been built by the alleged imitators, is
questionable. It smacks of allocation of markets rather
than competition; and in some cases, of expropriation
of private property rights in trade marks.
However, some developing and other countries might
see the agriculture approach as holding some promise: a
54 See IP/C/W/289 June 29, 2001: "Communication from
~gentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Guatemala, New Zealand,
Paraguay and the United States: extension of the protection of
geographical indications for wines and spirits to geographical
indications for all products: potential costs and implications":
"24. These industries may find potentially lucrative export mar-
kets closed to their products, as the government of the importing
market or a third party may claim exclusive rights over the terms
used to market those products. The TRIPS Council should be
wary of the potential of GIs to be used as a protectionist instru-
ment to restrict trade, particularly in the area of agriculture".
55 The question in terms of WTO/TRIPs rules remains
untested~ e.g. what would result under TRIPs if the United
States imported Californian wine under the name Champagne
into Australia, which has agreed with the European Union not to
use that name on domestic wines?
56 See "WTO talks: EU steps up bid for better protection of
regional quality products", IP/03/1178, Commission Press
Release, Brussels, August 28, 2003. The EU’s dispute with Can-
ada concerning the registration in that country of the trade mark
Parma for cured ham is an illustration of a case where prior trade
mark registration is seen as constituting a trade barrier, in this
case against imports into Canada of Parma ham by the Con-
sorzio del Prosciutto di Parma: see European Commission, DG
Trade, Report to the Trade Barriers Regulation Committee,
TBA proceedings concerning Canadian practices affecting
Community exports of Prosciutto di Parma, Brussels 1999.
chance to regain control in export markets of terms that
have become generic or registered as trade marks. But it
seems doubtful that many of the terms that those other
countries would hope to see included on the pre-emp-
tive list would ever obtain acceptance, even if negotia-
tions descended into downright haggling. In any case, it
may be that the proposal for total pre-emption of a
specific list of terms, and the invitation for other coun-
tries to add to such a list, are more strategic than real.
Many questions remain about the list: for instance on
what basis terms would be included (if any); whether
the list is static or dynamic; and what are the domestic
repercussions of inclusion of some and exclusion of
others?
Conclusions
Registered GI systems are as much an instrument of
agricultural policy as intellectual property.57 There are
arguably cogent arguments in favour of continuing
reliance on registered GIs in the European Union and
in other jurisdictions where the system is of long
standing and supports the protection of traditional
rural production methods, also providing guarantees
of consistent product quality. In such countries the
investment in establishing a system has already been
amortised. Small-scale production is common and
rural products are often marketed without further
modifications to end users. There is a strong identi-
fication between food and place in Europe which is
absent in much of the new world, such as Australia
and the Americas.~8 It may also be justified that
Europe "gets some of its GIs back", for n~ lost out-
side its borders.
But all Member States should be afforded the
opportunity to consider whether GI registration sys-
tems are in their national economic interest. They
may or may not fit within the wider domestic policy
matrix. There may be little realistic prospect of
regaining control over domestic GIs in foreign mar-
kets, because of existing TRIPs exceptions and the
doubtful status and outcome of the agriculture nego-
tiations proposals. The costs of a domestic GI register
may outweigh its benefits, and even if such a register
is geared only to the protection of foreign GIs on a
multilateral register, compliance costs, both in terms
of examination with a view to challenging, and in
terms of enforcement, may be quite considerable.
Other options, such as existing trade mark law brand-
ing strategies, which there is no reason not to employ
in rural industries, or certification and collective
marks, may present a cheaper, more flexible option,
and come at little additional cost to the taxpayer.
57 The Preamble to Council Regulation 2081/92 illustrates
this mix of policy motives, referring to diversification of rural
production, growth of rural incomes and opportunities, etc., as
well as consumer education and information, etc.
58 Vivas-Eugui points out that the United States "will always
feel more comfortable with systems based on private ownership
and will avoid the establishment of any intellectual property
rights of a public or mixed nature": see n. 1 above, at p.711.
[2004] E.I.RR. ISSUE 4 © SWEET & MAXWELL LIMITED [AND CONTRIBUTORS]
VAN CAENEGEM: REGISTERED GIs: [2004] E.I.P.R. 181
Countries newly introducing GI registration would
have to absorb considerable costs long before any tan-
gible benefits are experienced. GIs require expendi-
ture on international promotion as well as possible
legal actions. Although some expenses might be
spared by automatic multilateral protection through
inclusion on a register, such inclusion does not bring
commercial success in and of itself. It may also be
that other barriers to exports into countries such as
those of the European Union may substantially ham-
per trade, whether or not GI registration is in place.
GI registration does not overcome difficulties that
may exist in terms of quarantine, labelling, phyto-san-
itary criteria and broader agricultural trade
dynamics.
Nor is it proven that GIs would serve to indirectly
protect traditional knowledge and technology in an
efficient manner.59 In any case introduction of GI reg-
istration would not be warranted on the basis of such
speculative collateral benefits alone.
If we accept that the key question is whether GIs are
a desirable domestic policy instrument, above all else
sufficient time is required for this question to be given
detailed consideration in member countries. Proposals
that unduly limit this time are questionable on that
ground alone.
59 See Downes and Laird, n.52 above. It is principally indirect
GIs that give rise to speculation about the use of GIs in this
manner, a limited category of case in any event. And it seems
that there will only be rare cases where GI registration fulfils this
wider aim effectively, if at all. See also Final Report, Commis-
sion on Intellectual Property Rights, Chapter 4, Traditional
Knowledge and Geographical Indications, September 12, 2002,
available at www. iprcommission, org/.
[2004] E.I.RR. ISSUE 4 © SWEET & MAXWELL LIMITED [AND CONTRIBUTORS]
